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1. Introduction 
 
 
What are the characteristics of ‘good’ ownership structure? Does ownership structure matter for 
firm performance? Why certain firms have large block holders and others do not? Should the 
power of large shareholders be limited to avoid expropriation or encouraged to curb managerial 
discretion? These questions have been largely explored in corporate finance literature and we 
understand better now the intricacies of the relationship between ownership structure and firm 
performance. 
 
But empirical evidence on the impact of shareholders with significant equity holdings on 
corporate performance remains ambiguous. Various authors using different samples of firms and 
different empirical strategies obtain different, difficult to compare and sometimes contradictory 
results. It is increasingly recognized that the problem in disentangling this relationship is largely 
due to the pervasive endogeneity of ownership which has to be taken into account in order to 
obtain unbiased results. But the existing empirical evidence also suggests that the relationship 
between ownership and performance may depend on the type of the firm and on the period of 
observation in the life of the firm.  
 
The purpose of this paper is to explore more in details the determinants of ownership 
concentration and the relationship between ownership structure and firm value in the context of 
an economy undergoing important changes in its legal and regulatory framework, in 
macroeconomic policy and most of all, in its property rights allocation. Using a panel of firms 
listed on the Warsaw Stock Exchange (WSE) offers an unusual opportunity for this kind of 
investigation.  
 
The Polish economy was exposed to radical institutional changes in the nineties. Privatization 
strategy in Poland was strongly influenced by the willingness to create appropriate ownership 
structure in privatized firms, i.e. to ensure that powerful block holders control the firm. A large 
portion of state-owned enterprises was privatized and the conditions for entry of new firms were 
significantly eased. Some of the privatized and newly created firms have entered the stock 
exchange established in 1991. These firms are likely to show a lot of heterogeneity. Their 
ownership structure is likely to be determined by the firm origin and for privatized firms by the 
method of privatization. New firms, when they become listed on the stock exchange are likely to 
have, at least during the initial years of listing, more concentrated ownership structure than 
privatized firms. Moreover, new firms established by their founders in a market friendly 
environment may require less ownership, financial and industrial restructuring than previously 
state-owned enterprises.  
 
The sensitivity of firm performance to firm ownership structure is likely to vary across firms. It 
may also undergo important changes over time. Once firms are listed on the stock exchange, 
reallocation of ownership stakes becomes greatly facilitated. 1  
 
The first part of this paper is devoted to the exploration of the determinants of ownership 
concentration. Trying to understand why certain firms have large owners and others have 
dispersed ownership structure, I build on the extant literature and notably on Demsetz and Lehn 
(1985) and Himmelberg et al. (1999). The contribution of my paper to the literature consists in 
taking into account the importance of knowledge related activities. 2 The idea is that analyzing the 
relationship between managers and shareholders requires different perspectives in firms 
belonging to the sector of “new economy” than in firms belonging to more traditional industries 
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(Audretsch and Lehmann, 2002). In more ‘mature’ industries, it can be assumed that it is well 
understood what should be done and how and it is important to make sure that managers 
implement efficiently the objectives agreed on. In such conditions, the dominant concern is 
indeed about managerial shirking, laziness and laxity (Marshall, 1923). Such concern motivates 
the importance and high value of monitoring. In firms with strong human capital component, it is 
less clear what is the right strategy or the right project. Forcing managers to do a particular thing 
may be costly since shareholders may not know what the best thing to do is. In such highly 
uncertain environment, (‘uncertain’ in the sense of Knight), the crucial issue is less to make sure 
that the agent-manager realizes a given objective with a maximum effort than to incite the 
manager to search for the best project. 3  
 
Managers are more likely to show initiative if they have some latitude to make effort and 
undertake innovative actions. In Aghion and Tirole (1997) concentrated ownership provides 
incentives to monitor, but it also reduces the manager’s initiative or incentive to acquire 
information. Recognizing the importance of managerial initiative is at the heart of the theory of 
Burkart et al. (1997). They argue that increased monitoring by shareholders may be costly 
because it may depress initiative displayed by managers: managers are less likely to be active if 
they know that shareholders are likely to interfere. So too much monitoring may negatively affect 
managerial initiative and profitable investment opportunities will be lost. Burkart et al. (1997) 
view firm ownership structure as an instrument to solve the trade-off between control and 
initiative. Through more dispersed ownership structure shareholders commit themselves to 
weaker intervention which makes managers confident enough that they will not be dispossessed 
of the benefits of their initiative.  
 
The trade off between initiative and control may be particularly strong in firms belonging to 
highly technological sectors. In such firms, ownership concentration (reflecting the value of 
monitoring) is likely to be lower than in more traditional sectors. 4 I examine whether ownership 
concentration is related to the importance of knowledge related capital by including a dummy for 
firms belonging to high technology sector. 
 
I also use the importance of firm’s “soft” capital, measured as the share of intangibles in fixed 
assets, as an additional proxy for the firm’s specific uncertainty. 5 Following Zeckhauser and 
Pound (1990), I expect that the higher the firm R&D intensity, the more diffuse is the 
informational structure and the more difficult outside monitoring. Large shareholders are 
supposed to recognize the problem and, therefore ownership concentration is likely to be 
negatively related to soft capital intensity. 6 
 
The results show that the regression is able to explain on average about 25% of the variation in 
ownership concentration. They also confirm that firms belonging to highly technological sectors 
have more dispersed ownership structure. This effect is particularly noticeable in the sub-sample 
of ‘new’ firms which may be explained by the fact that high tech firms are almost exclusively 
‘new’. 
  
In the second part of the paper I explore the relationship between ownership concentration and 
firm value. In pooled OLS regression higher ownership concentration improves firms’ corporate 
value. When we take into account endogeneity of ownership, its impact on firm value becomes 
much stronger than in OLS regressions.  
 
The results reported in this paper suggest that firm heterogeneity may significantly affect 
ownership concentration and its impact on firm value. They also confirm the need to take into 
account endogeneity of ownership but also the difficulty of doing it. The validity of chosen 
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instruments should be carefully assessed and using alternative sets of instruments should be 
envisaged. Overall, the results yield a rather cautionary tale about one of the issues considered in 
corporate governance literature: “should the power of large shareholders be limited to avoid 
expropriation or encouraged to curb managerial discretion”. Regulatory authorities should be very 
careful and avoid imposing constraints on the adjustment of firm ownership structure to firm 
specific characteristics. 
 
Before I discuss these empirical results, in section 2 I briefly describe the relevant literature. In 
section 3 I present the data. Section 4 discusses the determinants of ownership concentration and 
section 5 the relationship between ownership and firm value. Conclusions are presented in section 
6.  
 
 
2. Literature  
 
 
Following the early work by Berle and Means (1932) and until the eighties, the main concern of 
the literature on corporate governance was the conflict of interest between shareholders and 
managers (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 7 Ownership concentration (ensuring better monitoring), 
and managerial equity holdings (increasing managerial effort and decreasing perquisite 
consumption), were supposed to lead to better firm performance. An important empirical literature 
examining this prediction mainly focused on the relationship between managerial ownership and 
firm value. Following Stulz (1988) who predicted a concave relationship, several papers, 
including Morck et al. (1988), McConnell and Servaes (1990), Hermalin and Weisbach (1991), 
Holderness et al. (1999) found that low levels of managerial ownership increase firm value but at 
higher levels of managerial ownership firm value decreases. The results of these single-equation 
studies were interpreted as the evidence of managerial entrenchment beyond some threshold of 
insider ownership.  
 
Since the 90s, careful observation of ownership structures across the world showed that dispersed 
shareholdings are much less frequent than expected and we observe instead a high degree of 
ownership concentration (La Porta et al., 1999; Becht and Roell, 1999). Consequently, the 
potential expropriation of the minority investors by the controlling owners became the main 
concern (Johnson et al., 2000, Faccio and Lang, 2002; Lehman and Weigand, 2000, Gugler and 
Weigand, 2003). It was recognized that large shareholders may be costly because they have other 
objectives than small shareholders and may expropriate the latter. 
 
Other costs of excessive ownership concentration have been underlined in recent literature and 
several theories have been proposed to explain the ambiguity of the relationship between 
ownership concentration and firm performance. Holmstrom and Tirole (1993) explored the trade-
off between ownership concentration and liquidity which may affect the informational role of the 
stock market. It has been also stressed that high ownership concentration limits diversification 
and reduces owners' tolerance towards risk (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Admati et al., 1994; Bolton 
and von Tadden, 1998). Finally, Burkart et al. (1997) analyzed how in some circumstances the 
control imposed by strong owners on managers may be too severe, restraining their initiative and 
incentives.   
 
An important strand of the literature focuses on the endogeneity of ownership structure in its 
relationship with firm performance. The initial argument about the endogeneity of ownership 
structure was formulated by Demsetz (1983). He argued that ownership structure is an outcome of 
shareholders’ decisions. Maximizing the firm value may require a concentrated or a diffuse 
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ownership structure. The trading of shares may reflect the desire of existing or potential owners to 
change their stakes. Following this important contribution, several papers explored empirically 
the impact of ownership structure on firm performance taking into account endogeneity of 
ownership. Demsetz and Lehn (1985), Hermalin and Weisbach (1991), Loderer and Martin 
(1997), Cho (1998), and Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) use a system of simultaneous equations 
and find no significant relationship between ownership and performance. Kole (1994) finds 
evidence of reverse causality, performance affecting ownership rather than the other way round.  
 
Himmelberg et al. (1999) argue that endogeneity of ownership may be largely due to individual 
heterogeneity. Using firm fixed effects they find no significant relationship and conclude that 
shareholders choose ownership structure optimally. Interestingly, Khanna et al. (2005) find that 
Himmelberg et al. (1999) results of no correlation between managerial ownership and firm value 
in a fixed effect estimation are specific to the period considered. If the sample is extended over 
the next 10 years, the correlation turns out to be significant. Controlling for unobservable firm 
level heterogeneity was criticized by Zhou (2001) who argued that including fixed effects may 
not allow detecting an effect of ownership on performance even in it existed.  
 
Gugler and Weigand (2003) consider simultaneously whether the largest shareholder’s stake 
matters for the endogeneity/causality relation in addition to managerial ownership. Using IV 
techniques they find, for US and Germany, that insider ownership does not significantly affect 
performance as measured by the return on total assets. But the largest shareholder remains 
significant for firm performance even if they control for simultaneity. There is also some 
empirical evidence of a negative impact of large equity holders on firm performance. Lehmann 
and Weigand (2000), focusing on German corporations, find indeed a negative effect of 
ownership concentration on firm performance.  
 
 
3. Empirical strategy 
 
Before exploring the complex relationship between ownership and performance, I first look at the 
determinants of ownership concentration. It is important to understand how firm ownership 
structure varies across firms and how it is affected by the listing on the stock exchange. One of 
the hypotheses I want to test is whether ownership concentration is lower in firms with an 
important share of knowledge related activities. Investigating the determinants of ownership 
concentration will hopefully also provide us with the potential instruments for this variable.  
 
Turning to the firm value equation, we know that the OLS results can be biased for two reasons: 
first, because of unobserved heterogeneity of firms which may be correlated with ownership 
concentration and firm performance; second, because of simultaneity and potential reverse 
causality between ownership and performance.  
 
A solution to the problem of unobserved heterogeneity is the use of panel data. Himmelberg et al. 
(1999) used panel techniques to control for firm level fixed effects and found that the impact of 
managerial shareholding is not significantly different from zero. I obtained similar results in the 
sample of Polish firms studied in this paper: once unobservable firm level fixed effects are 
included in the regression, ownership concentration does not seem to affect firm performance 
anymore (results available on request). 
 
Using a model with fixed effects to investigate the relationship between ownership and 
performance may be, however, misleading. Zhou (2001) argued that such approach may fail 
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because it may not allow detecting an effect of ownership on performance even if it existed. 8 
Using fixed effects we focus on within rather than cross-sectional variations. But what appears 
crucial in investigating the relationship between ownership and performance is to understand 
whether in some firms higher ownership concentration may be more beneficial than in others. An 
additional argument against treating unobservable variables as fixed effects comes from the 
specificity of the sample considered in this study. In a transition economy like the Polish one in 
the period under examination, firms are exposed to profound industrial, managerial and financial 
restructurings. It makes questionable the assumption that firm specific characteristics do not 
change over time. 9 Finally, fixed effects estimations are also costly because it is not possible to 
estimate coefficient on time-invariant variables. 
 
Taking these arguments into account 10 I focus on the endogeneity due to the correlation between 
ownership and idiosyncratic errors in firm value equation. In order to investigate the relationship 
between ownership concentration and firm value, we have to consider not only the possibility that 
ownership concentration is likely to affect firm performance but also the possibility that 
ownership structure may depend on the value of the firm. The impact of performance on owners’ 
decision to concentrate their holdings is a priori ambiguous. If shareholders believe they are able 
to create value and obtain benefits of control sufficiently large to override the cost of the effort 
and to compensate for the loss of benefits of diversification, they may be willing to increase their 
holdings in firms which have not yet capitalized their growth opportunities in the stock price. 11 
However, especially in emerging markets, with potentially high informational asymmetries, 
investors may also want to get a dominant position in a firm if they plan to extract value from the 
company: in that case they would prefer increasing their equity holdings in more profitable firms.  
 
Consequently, the empirical strategy adopted in this paper will rely on estimating a model of 
simultaneous equations: in the first equation, the dependent variable is ownership concentration 
measured as the share of the voting rights of the largest shareholder (ownconc); in the second 
equation the dependent variable is firm performance measured as Tobin’s Q (Q). 
 
Ownconc =f (Q, firm characteristics, Zownconc c(t), u(it)) 
Q = f (ownconc, firm characteristics, ZQ, c(t), e(it)) 
 
where c are year fixed effects, Zownconc is the vector of instruments for ownership concentration, 
ZQ is the instrument for Tobin’s Q and u(it) and e(it) are white noise errors. 
 
The obvious problem in estimating such system of equations is the problem of identification. We 
need at least two exogenous variables plausibly affecting only ownership concentration or firm 
value, not both of them. However, it is notoriously difficult to find valid instrumental variables 
for ownership concentration: most of the potential candidates are also likely to directly affect 
Tobin’s Q. I will follow here two main studies in the relevant literature (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; 
Himmelberg et al., 1999) and instrument ownership concentration in performance equation by 
using firm level volatility (its standard deviation and variance). This instrument has weaknesses 
but it was used previously in important contributions to the literature. Himmelberg et al. (1999) 
argued that stock price volatility is an acceptable although  not perfect  instrument for ownership 
structure; and that other potential candidates are probably worse because more likely to also 
affect Tobin’s Q. Also see Demsetz and Lehn (1985).  
 
Concerning the second equation, for Tobin’s Q, I will use initial profitability as a predetermined 
variable for Tobin’s Q. Initial profitability is calculated as a ratio of net profit to total assets 
averaged over the three years preceding the publication of the prospectus. Initial profitability is 
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likely to affect firm performance; however, there is little chance that it affects ownership 
concentration 
 
4. Data 
 
Our sample includes all non-financial companies traded on the Warsaw Stock Exchange (WSE).12 
The WSE was established in 1991 and for the last fifteen years has been developing rapidly. 
There were 8 listed firms in 1991 and 214 in 2003.  Market capitalisation of the WSE grew 
steadily through the period reaching 21 percent in 2003.  
  
The quality of the information on the listed firms is very good as the requirements of reporting 
and transparency on the Warsaw Stock Exchange are quite strict and comparable to those of 
Western European stock exchanges. 13 The initial data base was created relying on published, 
audited accounts of balance sheets and income statements. It has been extended manually by 
including detailed information on ownership structure and the method of privatization. The 
information on ownership structure includes the identity of all shareholders holding more than the 
mandatory disclosure threshold of 5 percent of the shares and the percentage of cash flow rights 
and voting rights they hold. We were able to collect this ownership information for all years 
between 1991 and 2003, with the exception of 13 firms which were introduced to the WSE in 
1991 and 1992: for these firms the Security and Exchange Commission (Komisja Papierow 
Wartosciowych) did not collect the ownership data in 1992 and 1993.  
 
Our sample of listed firms allows distinguishing firms that were previously state-owned and firms, 
which can be considered as ‘new’ in the sense that they never belonged to the state and were 
created as private firms by their founders. In 2003 there were 90 new firms and 124 privatized 
firms. 30 firms were privatized through IPOs, 55 through direct sale, 13 through leveraged 
employee and managerial buyout, and finally 26 listed companies were privatized in the 
framework of the National Investment Funds programme (a version of mass privatization 
scheme).14 The average employment in our firms is 1233 employees (median 509), the average 
age is 32 (median 23) and the average number of years of listing is 4 (median 3).  
 
Table 1 provides information on our sample for years 1991 – 2003. The number of firms entering 
the stock exchange varies significantly over time and reflects the privatization process and the 
development of the WSE. Table 2 shows the characteristics of the firms in the sample in 2003. 
These firms have an average Tobin’s Q of 1.30 and the largest owners control on average 43 
percent of voting shares.  
 
Table 3 compares privatized firms with new firms. The last column in the table provides statistics 
for testing the hypothesis of equal group means (t-statistics). The table reveals that on average 
new firms are, as could be expected, smaller than privatized firms; they have higher Tobin’s Q 
(1.50 versus 1.19) and their controlling owners hold a significantly larger portion of voting rights 
(47% versus 41%); they have more intangibles and have been listed for more years than 
privatized firms. The idiosyncratic risk (firm volatility)does not differ in a significant way 
between these two categories of firms.  
 
The important advantage of this data base is that it makes possible observing the change in 
ownership structure of the firms over time: we can see how the introduction of the firms on the 
stock exchange and the years of listing affect their ownership structure. Two dimensions of 
ownership structure are taken into account: ownership concentration and the identity of the largest 
shareholder. I use the commonly used concentration measure which is the fraction of voting rights 
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of the largest shareholder. Four groups of owners are identified: families, industrial firms, 
institutional investors, and the state. 
 
Table 4 shows that ownership of companies becomes more dispersed with the number of years of 
listing. 15  The average voting rights held by the largest shareholder decreases quite rapidly 
notably during the first three years of listing. When we look separately at privatized and ‘new’ 
firms, we can observe that the initial differences in ownership concentration disappear with time. 
16 
 
More detailed information on the evolution of the ownership structure can be found in table 5: it 
presents changes in ownership concentration by the type of largest owners during the first six 
years of listing. We can see that the most important changes took place in privatized firms in 
which the state was the largest shareholder: state’s voting rights declined on average from 85% to 
32% (the decrease of median values is even stronger). 17  In firms in which the largest 
shareholders were families, firms or financial institutions the changes in ownership concentration 
were less spectacular. 
 
 
4. Determinants of ownership concentration 
 
 
Demsetz (1983) and Demsetz and Lehn (1985) were first to argue that in equilibrium ownership 
structure is determined endogenously, trading off costs and benefits of ownership concentration. 
They suggested that whether shareholders hold large or small portions of firm equity depends on 
specific firm’s characteristics and on its contracting environment. Following Demsetz and Lehn, 
several author estimated ownership structure expanding the initial specification (see Himmelberg 
et al., 1999; Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001). 
 
I follow here these studies using similar explanatory variables for ownership concentration, 
measured as the share of the voting rights of the largest shareholder; I also augment the 
previously used specification along the lines discussed in the introduction. In order to distinguish 
firms by the importance of knowledge related activities and check whether firms with stronger 
human capital component have more dispersed ownership structure, I use a dummy variable for 
firms belonging to highly technological industries. I rely on the Warsaw Stock Exchange 
classification of listed equities, which distinguishes the segment of innovative technologies. I also 
use the observable measure of intangible assets as it appears on the balance sheet as a proxy for 
firm’s soft capital. Intangible assets include R&D expenditures, acquired software, licenses, good 
will, etc.  
 
Several control variables will be included in the regression for ownership concentration: 
 
Size 
In the existing empirical studies ownership concentration tends to be negatively affected by firm 
size (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985, Himmelberg et al. 1999). This result reflects probably wealth 
limitations (it is simply more costly to acquire large portion of equity in larger firms) and the 
concern with risk diversification. But size is also sometimes considered as a proxy for managerial 
discretion (Himmelberg et al., 1999); in that case we expect size will positively affect ownership 
concentration. Size may also be viewed by potential shareholders as a proxy for reputation. I 
measure size as the natural logarithm of the firm’s sales.18  
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Year dummies 
Year dummies are included to control for macroeconomic shocks common to all firms. The use of 
these dummies is particularly important in an economy undergoing profound institutional and 
systemic changes.   
 
Identity of shareholders 
Ownership concentration may depend on the identity of the equity holders. For instance, financial 
institutions are less likely to accumulate large portion of equity in a given company than an 
affiliated industrial firm. I distinguish four types of owners: family, the state (the Treasury, 
municipality or a government agency), financial institution (bank, insurance company or 
investment fund) and industrial firm. A firm is classified as being controlled by a family when 
there is an individual or a group of individual belonging to the same family who control the 
largest voting block of shares. I identify families relying on family surname. I also use a dummy 
if a foreign investor holds at least 20 % of voting rights in firm’s equity.  
 
Current profitability 
This variable, defined as net profit to sales, is often used in ownership equation19 as a proxy for 
agency problems.  
 
Volatility (risk) 
This is another proxy for agency problems. Demsetz and Lehn (1985), Himmelberg et al. (1999) 
and Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) motivate including risk as a determinant of ownership 
concentration by the principal agent theory: when the environment is more volatile, it is more 
difficult for shareholders to monitor managers but there are also more potential benefits from 
closer supervising the managers (they call it ‘control potential’). When firm environment is 
relatively stable, the argument goes, shareholders have less difficulty to monitor managers. 
Consequently, it is expected that highly risky firms will have higher ownership concentration. 
However, Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and Aggarwal and Samwick (2003) also argue that beyond 
some threshold of idiosyncratic risk, investors may prefer to reduce their exposure. Following this 
argument I also suppose that the relation between risk and ownership concentration is concave. 
 
I calculate each firm idiosyncratic risk using daily data of stock prices. The data on individual 
firm daily stock prices were collected from the data base provided by the Warsaw Stock 
Exchange. For each firm and for each year, I run a regression of firm’s daily return on the market 
return. I use the residual standard deviation in the firm’s return, i.e. the standard deviation in the 
firm’s return after the effect of its covariation with the market is taken out. 
 
Number of years of listing 
The longer the firm’s shares are traded on the stock exchange, the more is known about them and 
the potential agency problems become less important. It is therefore likely that ownership 
structure, which can be considered as an instrument of control and an answer to information 
asymmetries, will become less concentrated.  
 
Firm value 
Firm value will be included in the equation for ownership concentration to deal with the potential 
problem of reverse causality: it has been argued that although ownership may affect performance, 
ownership structure may also be affected by the quality of the firm.20 The issue of endogeneity of 
firm value in ownership concentration equation will be addressed later on, in a simultaneous 
equations framework. Here, I simply look at robust correlations but to alleviate the problem of 
endogeneity, use lagged values of firm value.  
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Industry affiliation 
Besides distinguishing companies from the segment for innovative technologies, I follow 
Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and keep dummies for utilities and media. Demsetz and Lehn (1985) 
suppose that regulated firms (utilities) are less concentrated because regulatory constraints may 
be a substitute for shareholder monitoring. They also distinguish firms by the potential of control 
they offer and expect this potential is particularly high in the case of media industry.  
 
Privatization method  
Particular privatization method may significantly affect ownership structure of privatized firms, 
especially during the initial years of listing. For instance, firms privatized in the framework of the 
Polish mass privatization scheme had initially a uniform ownership structure (the largest 
shareholder holding 33 percent of shares). 21 For instance, firms privatized in the framework of 
National Investment Funds programme (a form of mass privatization scheme) had at the time of 
privatization a uniform ownership structure (the leading NIF had 33% of shares, 27% of shares 
were uniformly distributed among 14 NIFs, the employees had 15% and the State 25% of shares). 
In firms privatized through IPO the state has initially an important stake. New firms, when they 
enter the stock exchange, are often owned by their founders and are likely to have, at least during 
the first years of listing, a rather more concentrated ownership structure than privatized firms. I 
classify privatized firms by four privatization methods: IPO, private sale, employee and 
managerial buy out, or mass privatization scheme (mpp).  
 
Consequently, I use the following model to estimate ownership concentration, defined as the 
logistic transformation of the share of the voting rights of the largest shareholder (Lvote1) 22: 
 
(1) 
Lvote1it = β0 + β1sizeit + β2 current_profitability+β3 volatilityit + β4 volatility²it + 
β5listingit + β6 familyit + β7 fininstit + β8 stateit + β9foreign20it +  
β10intangiblesit + β11Qit-1 + β12mediai + β13utilitiesi + β14hightechi +  
β15mppi + β16emboi + β17IPO + γt +εit 
 
 
where i and t represent the firm and time respectively; size is the logarithm of total sales; 
profitability is defined as net profits on sales; volatility is defined as standard error of the residual 
of CAPM equation per year; listing represents the number of years since the first listing; family, 
finist, state equal to one if, respectively, the largest share of voting rights is held by a member of a 
family, a financial institution or the state and zero otherwise (firm is a reference group); foreign20 
is a dummy equal to one if a foreign investor holds at least 20 % of shares of firm equity; 
intangibles is the share of intangible assets in fixed assets; Q is defined as the ratio of the market 
value of equity plus total debt divided by the book value of total assets; media and utilities equal 
one if the firm belongs respectively to utilities or media industry, and zero otherwise; high-tech 
equals to one if the firm belongs to the segment of high technology and zero otherwise; mpp, 
embo and IPO are dummy variables equal one if the firm was privatized, respectively, in the 
framework of the mass privatization programme,  through managerial and employee leveraged 
buy-out or through public share offering (private sale is a reference group); finally, γt  represent 
year dummies (to control for common macroeconomic shocks); εit is a white-noise error.  
   
The results of the OLS regressions are presented in table 6. In columns (1) – (5) the results refer 
to the whole sample. We can observe how including additional variables increases the 
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explanatory power of the regression which eventually (column (5) is quite high: we can explain 
26 % of the variation in ownership concentration.  
 
Concerning the measures of knowledge related capital, the results give support to the idea that 
ownership concentration varies inversely with intangibles and is significantly lower in firms 
belonging to the sector of high technology. Interestingly, even after controlling for high 
technology sector, I get significant result on the coefficient of intangibles. This result is quite 
strong as it could be expected that much of the variation in ‘soft capital’ could be explained by 
the industry dummy.  
 
The impact of firm’s idiosyncratic risk on ownership concentration is, as expected, positive. In 
some regressions the results show that risk affects ownership concentration in a non-linear way.  
 
In columns (6) and (7) I perform separate regressions of ownership concentration on identical sets 
of explanatory variables for two smaller samples of privatized and new firms. We can see that the 
significant result on the proxies for uncertainty, obtained in the entire sample, is driven by new 
firms: intangibles and the dummy for the segment of high technology are insignificant in 
privatized firms. This can be explained by the fact that only one privatized firm (14 observations) 
belongs to the sector of high technology and intangibles are on average three times higher in 
‘new’ firms than in privatised firms. It turns out that the regression is able to explain much better 
ownership concentration in privatized than in new firms: in the former R² equals 0.33 and the 
latter 0.21. This suggests that ‘new’ firms are closer to an ‘equilibrium’ ownership structure. In 
privatized firms more adjustment is probably needed. In the last column (8), adding privatization 
methods as additional explanatory variables increases R². The way firms were privatized 
significantly affects their ownership concentration, especially during the initial years of listing.23 
 
Table 6 does not give support to reverse causality hypothesis: the coefficient of the firm value is 
insignificant. But to properly deal with the issue of reversed causality, we need a simultaneous 
equations framework (see section 5 below).  
 
 
5. Ownership concentration and firm value. 
 
In order to test the impact of ownership concentration on firm value, I estimate the system of 
simultaneous equations in which the first equation is the equation (1) for ownership concentration 
and the second equation is the following equation (2) for Tobin’s Q:   
(2) 
 Qit = δ0 + δ1Lvote1it + δ2initial_profitability + δ3 current_profitabilityit + δ4sizeit 
+ δ5 listingit + δ6familyit + δ7 fininstit + δ8 stateit + δ9foreign20it + δ10intangiblesit 
+δ11media+ δ12utilities + δ13hightech+δ14mpp+δ15embo+δ16IPO+ λt +ε’it 
 
where i and t represent the firm and time respectively; Q is defined as the ratio of market value of 
equity  plus book value of total debt to book value of total assets; Lvote1 is defined as the logistic 
transformation of the percentage voting rights held by the largest shareholders; initial profitability 
is the ratio of net profit to total assets averaged over the three years preceding the publication of 
the prospectus; current profitability is defined as net profit to sales; size is the logarithm of total 
sales; family, finist and state are dummy variables equal to one if, respectively, the largest share 
of voting rights is held by a member of a family, a financial institution or the state (firm is a 
reference group); foreign20 is a dummy variable equal to one if a foreigner holds at least 20% of 
firm equity, and zero otherwise; intangibles is the share of intangible assets in fixed assets; media, 
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utilities and high tech represent dummy variables for the three industries; mpp, embo and IPO are 
dummy variables equal one if the firm was privatized, respectively, in the framework of the mass 
privatization programme,  through managerial and employee leveraged buy-out or through public 
share offering (private sale is a reference group);λt  represent year dummies (to control for 
common macroeconomic shocks); and ε’it is a white-noise error. 
 
The necessary conditions for identification of such a simultaneous equations system are met 
because we include exogenous variables plausibly affecting only ownership concentration or firm 
value, not both of them. In the first equation, standard deviation and variance of volatility are 
used as instruments. These instruments were used in the literature and I follow this strategy for 
the sake of comparability.  
 
Concerning the second equation, initial profitability, i.e. average firm profitability before it is 
listed on the stock exchange, is likely to affect firm performance; but there is little chance that it 
directly affects ownership concentration. The presence of current profitability in ownership 
concentration equation makes this identifying restriction assumption even more convincing.  
 
Let me note that capital structure does not appear in this model. Debt is clearly one of the 
mechanisms of control that should be taken into account in a complete system of equations. 
However, including it would require estimating a much bigger system of equations taking into 
account a two-way relation of debt and performance and the relation between debt and ownership 
structure (see Loderer and Martin, 1997). This will certainly be one of the extensions of this paper.  
 
In another specification not reported here, I have also explored the impact of dual class shares on 
firm value. Firm with such explicit separation of ownership and control may have important 
agency problems and may be less valuable than firms in which voting rights are equal cash flow 
rights. 24  Claessens et al. (2002) found indeed in their study of Asian firms that firm value 
decreases when the control rights of the largest shareholder exceed its cash flow rights. Lins 
(2002) found that this effect is significant in countries with low shareholder protection. In the 
sample studied in this paper the coefficient of the dummy variable indicating for each firm if it 
issues dual-class shares turned out to be insignificant.25 
 
In table 7, I report the results of OLS and of the second stage of 2SLS regressions for Tobin’s Q. 
26 I am mainly interested in the coefficient of ownership concentration δ1, other variables being 
used to control for various observable firm characteristics. For instance, the identity of the largest 
owner is included because different owners may have different incentives and capacities to 
perform efficient monitoring. So the relationship between concentrated ownership and firm 
performance may be sensitive to the type of the controlling shareholder. In the case of transition 
economies, it was notably argued that foreign investors bringing about their competence and the 
knowledge of market economy might have important positive effect on firm performance. 27 Let 
us note that in the sample of Polish firms considered in this paper the impact of foreign investors 
on firm value remain ambiguous.  
 
We can observe that the increase in the share of the largest owner positively affects firm value 
and that this result in OLS regression is driven by the sub-sample of privatized firms (in ‘new’ 
firms, the coefficient of ownership concentration is not significantly different from zero). Durbin-
Wu-Hausman test of the endogeneity of ownership concentration does not allow rejecting the 
hypothesis of the correlation between ownership concentration and the error term. Therefore, in 
columns (5) – (7) I present the results for the 2SLS. We can see that after controlling for 
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endogeneity, the impact of ownership concentration on Tobin’s Q is stronger as compared with 
OLS results. 28  
 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
 
The main findings of this paper are as follows. Concerning the determinants of ownership 
concentration, the empirical results give support to the hypothesis that firms belonging to the 
sector of high technology have lower ownership concentration. The results reveal great 
heterogeneity across firms and over time. In ‘new’ firms, more similar to ‘normal’ firms in 
developed market economies, the impact of firm’s specific uncertainty proxied by the importance 
of knowledge related activities is important. In privatized, previously state-owned firms, 
ownership concentration is highly sensitive to the legacy of privatization methods: important 
explanatory variables during the early years of listing, they loose, however, their significance 
after a couple of years. This suggests that shareholders progressively adjust their ownership 
structure to firm specific constraints and the requirements of firm environment. When firm’s 
ownership structure approaches an ‘equilibrium’ level, it becomes more sensitive to variables 
representing firm specific risk and uncertainty. 
 
In the case of privatised firms, OLS regression does not give consistent results and we have to 
take into account the endogeneity of ownership concentration. Consequently I estimate a system 
of simultaneous equations, in which ownership is the dependent variable in the first equation and 
firm value is the dependent variable in the second equation. It turns out that the impact of 
ownership on performance is even stronger when we control for the endogeneity of ownership. 
 
More generally, answering the question what the characteristics of ‘good’ ownership structure are 
may depend on the underlying theory of the firm. The initial view of the advantages of ownership 
concentration in joint stock companies characterized by the separation of ownership and control 
was determined by the concern about the opportunistic behavior of managers. Far from being 
considered as entrepreneurs, managers of large corporations became even treated as civil servants: 
Schumpeter (1943) argued that the entrepreneurial function became obsolete because of the 
routinization of innovation. The growing importance of knowledge and human capital in the 
operation of firm shifts the focus of concern: excessive ownership concentration may stifle 
managerial initiative. This may be particularly true, and the results obtained in this paper support 
this hypothesis, in firms with high share of knowledge related activities.  
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Table 1: Description of the sample: number of new and privatised firms 
 
Description of the sample of non-financial firms listed on the Warsaw Stock Exchange used in 
this study: distribution of listed firms included in the sample by year and the origin of the firm 
(new versus privatized). The number of observations says for how many firms we have data on 
the ownership structure; financial data may be missing for some of the observations.  
 
 
Year Number 
of 
observations 
Number of 
privatized 
firms 
Number of 
new 
firms 
 
1991 
 
8
 
8
 
0 
1992 5 5 0 
1993 5 4 1 
1994 34 31 3 
 1995 49 42 7 
1996 66 52 14 
1997 197 140 57 
1998 214 148 66 
1999 224 151 73 
2000 234 146 88 
2001 234 144 90 
2002 229 139 90 
2003 214 124 90 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics 
 
Characteristics of the sample of non-financial firms listed on the Warsaw Stock Exchange; 2003 
 
 
Variables 
 
Definition 
 
 
Mean 
 
Median 
 
Standard 
Deviation  
 
Tobin’s Q 
 
(market value of equity + book 
value of total debt)/ book value 
of total assets 
 
1.30 0.99 0.97 
Initial 
profitability 
 
Average net profit/total assets, 
for the years preceding the 
publication of  the prospectus 
 
0.22 0.19 0.20 
Ownership 
concentration 
Share of the voting rights of 
the largest shareholder 
 
0.43 0.40 0.23 
Firm size Logarithm of total sales  
 
11.10 11.26 2.07 
Years of 
listing 
Number of years since the first 
listing 
 
5.57 5.0 2.66 
Intangibles  The share of intangible assets 
in fixed assets  
 
0.02 0.003 0.04 
Operating 
income 
Net profit/sales  -0.34 0.02 3.88 
Volatility Standard error of the residual 
of CAPM equation 
 
3.70 3.35 2.06 
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Table 3: Differences in means of the main characteristics between 
privatized and new firms 
 
Characteristics of the sample of privatized and ‘new’ non-financial firms listed on the Warsaw 
Stock Exchange; 2003. See table 2 for the definition of the variables. The last column provides 
the t-statistics for the differences in means between privatized and ‘new’ firms. Significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is denoted ***, **, and *, respectively.  
 
 
 
 
 
Variable 
 
 
Privatized 
 
New 
 
t-statistics 
 
Tobin’s Q 
 
1.19 
 
1.50 
 
-2.07** 
    
Initial profitability 
 
0.21 0.26 -1.45 
Ownership 
concentration 
 
0.41 0.47 -1.87* 
Firm’s size 
 
11.36 10.79 1.98** 
Years of listing 
 
6.48 4.14 7.46*** 
Intangibles 
 
0.01 0.03 -2.76*** 
Operating income 
 
0.52 -0.11 -0.74 
Volatility 3.92 3.33 1.80* 
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Table 4: The change in ownership concentration in listed firms by their 
origin (privatized/new) 
 
The table presents summary statistics on ownership concentration measured as the share of the 
voting rights of the largest shareholder in our sample of non-financial firms listed on the Warsaw 
Stock Exchange between 1991 and 2003. The first 8 years of listing are reported. Ownership data 
before the first listing comes from the offering prospectuses. N represents the number of 
observations 
 
  
Voting rights of the largest shareholder by the number of years of listing  
 
 
Sample 
 
Prospectus 
 
1 
 year  
 
2 
years 
 
3 
years 
 
4 
years 
 
5 
years 
 
6 
years 
 
7 
years 
 
8 
years 
 
All 
Mean 
Median 
N 
 
 
0.5286 
0.4668 
257 
 
 
0.5005 
0.43 
257 
 
 
0.4070 
0.34 
234 
 
 
 
0.3982 
0.33 
220 
 
 
0.4206 
0.3338 
221 
 
 
0.4323 
0.3509 
206 
 
 
0.4123 
0.3518 
183 
 
 
0.3949 
0.34 
157 
 
 
0.3725 
0.325 
103 
 
Privatized 
Mean 
Median 
N 
 
 
0.5177 
0.4195 
146 
 
 
0.4894 
0.3651 
148 
 
 
 
0.3631 
0.329 
137 
 
 
0.3618 
0.3202 
138 
 
 
0.3878 
0.3299 
143 
 
 
0.4033 
0.3291 
140 
 
 
0.3908 
0.3333 
128 
 
 
0.3960 
0.345 
118 
 
 
0.3750 
0.3252 
80 
 
New 
Mean 
Median 
N 
 
 
0.5428 
0.49 
111 
 
 
0.5156 
0.4738 
109 
 
 
0.4690 
0.4521 
97 
 
 
0.4595 
0.4168 
82 
 
 
0.4807 
0.47 
78 
 
 
0.4938 
0.5 
66 
 
 
0.4625 
0.4396 
55 
 
 
0.3914 
0.3338 
39 
 
 
0.3638 
0.3236 
23 
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Table 5: The change in ownership concentration in listed firms by their 
origin and identity of the largest owner 
 
The table presents summary statistics on the change in ownership concentration (during the first 
six years of listing) measured as the share of the voting rights of the largest shareholder in a 
sample of non-financial firms listed on the Warsaw Stock Exchange between 1991 and 2003. I 
consider four types of owners: families, financial institutions, industrial firms and the government. 
N represents the number of observations.  
 
Voting rights of the largest shareholder during the first six years of listing Identity of the 
largest equity 
holder Prospectus  1 year   2 years  3 years 4 years   5 years   6 years  
Family 
Privatized 
Mean 
Median 
N 
New firms 
Mean 
Median 
N 
 
 
0.297 
0.284 
14 
 
0.56 
0.5 
69 
 
 
0.309 
0.284 
14 
 
0.522 
0.480 
70 
 
 
0.270 
0.226 
13 
 
0.478 
0.451 
53 
 
 
0.289 
0.225 
17 
 
0.438 
0.384 
47 
 
 
0.325 
0.250 
21 
 
0.435 
0.361 
42 
 
 
0.341 
0.302 
25 
 
0.455 
0.450 
35 
 
 
0.328 
0.305 
26 
 
0.457 
0.42 
29 
Financial 
institution 
Privatized 
Mean 
Median 
N 
New firms 
Mean 
Median 
N 
 
 
 
0.310 
0.33 
55 
 
0.264 
0.179 
8 
 
 
 
0.293 
0.33 
52 
 
0.295 
0.198 
9 
 
 
 
0.267 
0.299 
59 
 
0.349 
0.335 
8 
 
 
 
0.271 
0.294 
47 
 
0.281 
0.263 
6 
 
 
 
0.292 
0.269 
40 
 
0.437 
0.370 
5 
 
 
 
0.276 
0.254 
33 
 
0.425 
6.274 
4 
 
 
 
0.277 
0.250 
28 
 
0.270 
0.231 
3 
Firm 
Privatized 
Mean 
Median 
N 
New firms 
Mean 
Median 
N 
 
 
0.525 
0.511 
34 
 
0.568 
0.557 
29 
 
 
0.460 
0.450 
38 
 
0.568 
0.569 
25 
 
 
0.459 
0.479 
46 
 
0.467 
0.453 
31 
 
 
0.455 
0.461 
53 
 
0.528 
0.446 
24 
 
 
0.468 
0.466 
65 
 
0.58 
0.5526 
27 
 
 
0.506 
0.498 
66 
 
0.575 
0.558 
25 
 
 
0.484 
0.48 
61 
 
0.493 
0.53 
22 
State 
Privatized 
Mean 
Median 
N 
New firms 
Mean 
Median 
N 
 
 
0.849 
0.999 
43 
 
0.667 
0.775 
3 
 
 
0.796 
0.999 
44 
 
0.669 
0.780 
3 
 
 
0.495 
0.503 
19 
 
0.645 
0.780 
3 
 
 
0.391 
0.315 
21 
 
0.602 
0.667 
3 
 
 
0.384 
0.349 
17 
 
0.751 
0.751 
2 
 
 
0.338 
0.292 
16 
 
0.513 
0.513 
1 
 
 
0.324 
0.275 
13 
 
0.513 
0.513 
1 
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Table 6: Determinants of ownership concentration: OLS estimates 
 
The table shows the regression results of ownership concentration in the sample of non-financial firms listed on the Warsaw Stock Exchange, 
measured by the logistic transformation of the percentage voting rights held by the largest shareholders (Lvote1), on the set of explanatory 
variables. See table 2 for the definition of other variables. All regressions include a constant term and year fixed effects.. Robust standard errors 
are presented in parentheses. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is denoted ***, **, and *, respectively.  
 
Variables  All
(1) 
All  
 (2) 
All  
 (3) 
 All  
(4) 
All  
(5) 
New 
(6) 
Privatized 
(7) 
Privatized 
(8) 
 
Firm size 0.254 
(0.041)*** 
0.148 
(0.043)*** 
0.138 
(0.044)*** 
0.144 
(0.033)*** 
0.143 
(0.033)*** 
0.128 
(0.059)*** 
0.169 
(0.043)*** 
0.186 
(0.044)*** 
Profitability 
   
         
         
         
         
-0.022 
(0.023) 
0.014 
(0.022) 
-0.014 
(0.022) 
-0.008 
(0.015) 
-0.008 
(0.015) 
-0.030 
(0.063) 
-0.013 
(0.015) 
-0.018 
(0.015) 
Volatility  
(std) 
0.151 
(0.070)** 
0.152 
(0.065)*** 
0.156 
(0.065)** 
0.214 
(0.050)*** 
0.207 
(0.050)*** 
0.268 
(0.096)*** 
0.231 
(0.066)*** 
0.190 
(0.066)** 
Volatility² 
(variance) 
-0.005 
(0.004) 
-0.005 
(0.004) 
-0.005 
(0.004) 
-0.007 
(0.003)*** 
-0.007 
(0.003)*** 
-0.009 
(0.005)* 
-0.009 
(0.005)* 
-0.007 
(0.005) 
Years of listing  -0.229 
(0.028)*** 
-0.235 
(0.028)*** 
-0.175 
(0.022)*** 
 
-0.174 
(0.022)*** 
-0.191 
(0.052)*** 
-0.153 
(0.026)*** 
-0.124 
(0.027)*** 
Intangibles -3.266
(1.583)** 
-3.511 
(1.255)*** 
-2.772 
(1.278)** 
-3.857 
(1.912)** 
-0.223 
(0.1.922) 
-0.193 
(1.915) 
Tobin’s Q (t-1)    0.041 
(0.053) 
0.078 
(0.056) 
0.052 
(0.092) 
0.020 
(0.081) 
0.058 
(0.081) 
High tech     -0.317 
(0.163)** 
-0.571 
(0.221)*** 
-0.288 
(0.352) 
-0.132 
(0.352) 
mpp 0.311
(0.135)** 
embo -0.220
(0.137) 
IPO -0.269
(0.129)** 
Type of owner no yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
media and utilities no no no no yes yes yes yes 
R2 
N 
0.090 
1185 
0.221 
1185 
0.224 
1185 
0.254 
1002 
0.258 
1002 
0.207 
297 
0.328 
705 
0.343 
705 
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Table 7: Ownership concentration and firm value: OLS and 2SLS 
 
The table shows the regression results for Tobin’s Q in the sample of non-financial firms listed on the Warsaw Stock Exchange. Lvote1 is the 
logistic transformation of the percentage voting rights held by the largest shareholders. See table 2 for the definition of other variables. All 
regressions include time fixed effects, dummies for media, utilities and high tech industries, dummies for the type of the largest owner and 
constant term. Dummies for privatization methods are included in regressions for all and privatized firms. Standard errors are presented in 
parentheses. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is denoted ***, **, and *, respectively.  
 
Variables   All
OLS 
(1) 
All  
OLS 
(2) 
New 
OLS 
 (3) 
Privatized 
OLS  
(4) 
All 
2SLS 
(5) 
New 
2SLS 
(6) 
Privatized 
2SLS 
(7) 
Lvote1  0.025
(0.013)* 
0.028 
(0.013)** 
0.032 
(0.037) 
0.025 
( 0.011)** 
0.975 
(0.229)*** 
0.749 
(0.338)** 
0.497 
(0.168)*** 
Firm size -0.014 
(0.018) 
-0.024 
(0.018) 
-0.071 
(0.037)** 
0.012 
(0.019) 
-0.102 
(0.039)*** 
-0.099 
(0.054)* 
-0.043 
(0.034) 
Current profitability -0.038 
(0.010)*** 
-0.037 
(0.009)*** 
-0.036 
(0.047) 
-0.039 
(0.007)*** 
-0.022 
(0.017) 
-0.050 
(0.065) 
-0.029 
(0.010)*** 
Years of listing -0.006 
(0.014) 
-0.012 
(0.014) 
-0.071 
(0.035)* 
0.006 
(0.013) 
00.129 
(0.044)*** 
0.091 
(0.087) 
0.068 
(0.027)*** 
Intangibles  
  
        
     
        
-0.305
(0.737) 
0.057 
(0.731) 
0.635 
(1.311) 
-0.752 
(0.921) 
3.157 
(1.562)** 
3.344 
(2.331) 
-0.560 
(1.239) 
Foreign20 0.170
(0.063)*** 
0.156 
(0.062)*** 
0.311 
(0.172)* 
0.078 
(0.055) 
-0.596 
(0.208)*** 
-0.377 
(0.385) 
-0.257 
(0.135)* 
Initial profitability   0.683 
(0.127)*** 
0.798 
(0.240)*** 
0.576 
(0.155)* 
0.817 
(0.257)*** 
0.547 
(0.365) 
0.567 
(0.168)*** 
F-stat 1st stage 
 
7.75
(0.000) 
3.10 
(0.03) 
5.00 
(0.002) 
R2 
N 
0.254 
1185 
0.273 
1185 
0.264 
365 
0.235 
820 
. 
1002 
. 
297 
. 
705 
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1 See a recent paper by Helwege et al. (2005). Exploring what makes US firms becoming widely held over 
time they find that variables motivated by agency theory are weak in explaining the evolution of ownership 
and stock market variables are important.  
2 Carlin and Mayer (2003) examine the possibility that firms in some industries may require specific types 
of ownership and control. Rajan and Zingales (2000) argue that the theory of the firm should be revisited 
because of a significant structural movement towards the importance of human capital, at the expense of 
other, more tangible assets. 
3 Demsetz (1983) considers that one of the costs of concentrated ownership is the disincentive effect of 
monitoring. Positive trade-off between uncertainty and incentives in the context of pay-for-performance 
contracts is analyzed by Prendergast (2002). He argues that contrary to the standard prediction of agency 
theory, firms delegate decision-making power more in uncertain environments. It happens because a 
principal may have little idea what the right kinds of effort in such cases are and the marginal returns to 
delegation are likely to be higher in more uncertain environments. 
4 Bolton and von Tadden (1999) argue that the value of monitoring may influence the degree of ownership 
concentration.  
5  Intangibles include R&D expenditures, patents, brands, goodwill and any other nonmonetary assets 
without physical substance.   
6 Moral hazard theories predict that in firms with more soft assets there is more scope for discretionary 
spending, so this variable should positively affect ownership concentration. In order to take into account the 
possibility that more volatility in firm’s environment increases the value of monitoring, in the regressions 
for ownership concentration I will also include a proxy for firm idiosyncratic risk.  
7 For the review of the literature see Shleifer and Vishny (1997). 
8 Also see Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) 
9 Hausman test does not allow using random instead of fixed effects.  
10 Additional arguments comes from Pindado and de la Torre (2004) who tried to identify the main source 
of endogeneity of ownership and found that that, in a sample of Spanish firms, it is rather due to the 
simultaneity between ownership and firm value than to unobservable heterogeneity.  
11  Kahn and Winton (2002) predict a negative correlation between firm performance and ownership 
concentration.  
12 I do not include banks and other financial companies because they have specific problems of valuation 
and regulation, which would make the comparison difficult.  
13 See Glaeser et al. (2001) for the description of the stringent regulation of the securities market in Poland. 
14 For details of the National Investment Funds program see Grosfeld and Hashi (2005). 
15  Helwege et al. (2005) show that US companies’ ownership also becomes less concentrated following 
their IPO.  
16  The information provided in tables 4 and 5 should be taken with caution as the sample changes across 
years. We do not know to what extent changes in ownership concentration are driven by changes in the 
sample or by changes within firms.   
17  Let us note that the equity holdings of the state in ‘new firms’ seem high but these numbers concern a 
very limited number of firms (1-3).   
18 As size will also be included in the regression for Tobin’s Q, I use sales rather than assets to avoid a 
spurious correlation with the denominator of Tobin’s Q (see Loderer and Martin, 1997).  
19 See, for instance, Himmelberg et al. (1999) 
20 Kole (1994) provides evidence of a reverse causality: performance affects ownership rather than the other 
way round.  
21 In a recent paper, Boubakri et al. (2005) include privatization method in their estimation of cross-firm 
differences in ownership concentration.  
22 Such logistic measure is currently used in the literature (see for instance Demsetz and Lehn, 1985, and 
Himmelberg et al., 1999). It converts a bounded number (the simple percentage measure which varies from 
0 to 100%) to an unbounded figure. 
23 The results of separate regressions for the early and late years of listing confirm this hypothesis (results 
available on request). 
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24 The hypothesis that the difference between cash flow rights and control rights is associated with a lower 
firm value was considered, for instance, by Shleifer and Vishny (1997).  
25 The use of dual-class shares is much more frequent in new than in privatized firms: the average value of 
the dummy variable indicating the use of dual-class shares is 0.58 in the case of new firms and 0.22 in the 
case of privatized firms. It is likely that using dual class shares, the initial founders of the ‘new’ firms try to 
preserve greater degree of control than the allocation of cash flow rights would guarantee.  
26 I only present the results of the second stage, as the estimates of the first equation were already discussed. 
However, at the bottom of table 7, I report  F-statistics for the first stage of the regressions.  
27  However, Klapper et al. (2005), looking for the impact of foreign owners on the improvement of 
corporate governance standards, found that foreign investors do not significantly differ from domestic 
owners.  
28 A similar result was obtained by Gugler and Weigand (2003). 
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